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National War College

Regional Security Partners: The Potential for Collective Security

COL Jimmy Tan
Seminar M
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Course 5605: Military Strategy and Operations

COL Thomas Smith
Faculty Seminar Leader

CAPT Jess Kelso
Faculty Advisor

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The end of the Cold War has dramatically changed the strategic landscape of the world. In a strategic environment dominated politically, economically and militarily by the US, the US is enjoying a "strategic lull".¹ The threat of big power and regional conflicts has diminished. However the security landscape is now characterized by political fragmentation, Third World chaos, failed states and ethnic conflicts among others. The collapse of the bipolar power structure has removed the restraints on such conflicts.

In addition, there has been an evolution in two key principles of international order: the sovereignty of states and the norm of nonintervention.² Under pressures of the normative claims of the role of individual human rights, economic interdependence, and the process of pooling of sovereignty, the concept of sovereignty of states, as defined under the Treaty of Westphalia, has taken on a new meaning. Together with the removal of superpower restraints in the post-Cold War era, the consequence has been a multitude of new claimants to sovereignty.

Similarly, these same pressures have resulted in an increasing violation of the principle of nonintervention as dramatically demonstrated by examples in Somalia, Haiti and Yugoslavia. In summary, the changing concept of sovereignty and the collapse of the bipolar power structure of the Cold War have resulted in an increase in the number of incidences of intervention. From 1988 to 1996, there were twice as many UN peacekeeping operations as in the organization's first three decades.³ From a cost of \$254 million in 1988, the UN peacekeeping budget

¹ Hans A. Binnendijk and Patrick L. Clawson, ed., *Strategic Assessment 1997* (Washington Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1997), p. 241

² J. Bryan Hehir, "Intervention: From Theories to Cases," *Ethics and International Affairs*, 1998, Vol. 9, p. 2

³ Jyoti Khanna, Todd Sandler and Hirofumi Shimizu, "Sharing the Financial Burden for UN and NATO Peacekeeping, 1976-1996," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 42, No. 2, Apr 1998, p. 177

expanded to \$3.4 billion in 1995.⁴ The US military increasingly finds itself involved in such intervention activities. Since the end of Operation Desert Storm till 1996, the US had committed its armed forces to a wide range of military operations over 30 times. As of June 1996, 50 000 US troops were deployed in various regions around the world in 13 military operations.⁵

As these intervention operations mount, the US military is concerned with the consequent drain on resources and the implications on its ability to carry out the core business of the military. The Department of Defense's Bottom-Up Review, which was completed in 1993, provided a requirement for enough forces to fight in two major theaters of war nearly simultaneously. The department's Quadrennial Defense Review, published in 1997, essentially reaffirmed that requirement. While intervention may be covered as part of the strategy of "Shape, Respond and Prepare Now" nothing is stated for long-term deployments of military forces required for keeping the peace in intra-state conflicts while changes are made to get at the root causes of such conflicts. Increasingly, military commanders have to deal with issues of operational tempo, drop in combat readiness and the capability to operate nearly simultaneously in two major theaters of war. There are growing questions of whether the military is over-stretched.⁶ In such an environment, it is more difficult to support military involvement in activities like peacekeeping, humanitarian missions in places that the US has no readily apparent vital interest.

Identification of vital interest as part of the formulation of the national security strategy can be seen both as a justification for the use of military force as well as a mechanism for controlling the demand for the limited resources of the

⁴ Norman Bowen, "The Future of United Nations Peacekeeping," *International Journal on World Peace*, Vol XIV, No 2, June 1997, p 7

⁵ Foreword by General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Andrew J Goodpaster, *When Diplomacy Is Not Enough: Managing Multinational Military Interventions*, (New York Carnegie Corporation, July 1996), p v

⁶ Brian Knowlton, "Is US Straining Military? Critics Dubious of Simultaneous Two-War Theory," *International Herald Tribune*, March 23, 1999, p 1

military. To meet the increasing demand, the US can either unilaterally increase its own military resources or develop other resources. In areas not considered vital to the US, unilateral increases of resources, to build up additional capability for intervention missions, is extremely difficult to justify domestically. The US public and Congress is not easily convinced of US vital interest in these intervention missions. With the end of the Cold War, Congress and the public expect to extract a peace dividend rather than pay a "peace tax". The current military budget of \$270 b is already a sizeable portion of the federal budget. There are also other domestic priorities like social security and Medicare entitlements.

In the face of domestic pressure, one alternative is to develop other resources. One attractive option is to empower and develop regional security organizations. The existence and recent development of regional organizations provide potential candidates for nurture as multiple centers of security. A list of regional organizations is provided in the annex. These regional organizations should be encouraged to take on regional collective security roles. In his 1992 report to the Security Council, *Agenda for Peace*, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali underscored the productive roles that regional organizations can play in the areas of preventive diplomacy, peace operations and post-conflict peace building. He further opined that regional bodies could "not only lighten the burden but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization."⁷

Hence the proposal is to develop multiple centers of security by fostering efforts by the community of democratic nations. These regionally based bodies would be self policing with responsibilities for collective security. In the initial stages, the US would act as a supporting body in areas where it has a comparative advantage like imagery and technology. The UN could act as a

⁷ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, (New York: United Nations 1992) p 37

legitimizing authority to prevent the wanton use of intervention in meddling with the internal affairs of another state.

Today there are significant changes in the strategic environment, which are favorable to the implementation of such a proposal. Globalization of the economy has led to greater economic interdependence and demonstrated the increased use of regional groupings. This is aptly seen in the adoption of the Euro as the common currency in Europe and the growing success of regional groupings such as Mercosur and ASEAN. Regional stability is an important pre-condition for the success of a region. It is inevitable that these regional groupings would have to eventually address regional security to preserve their ability to grow economically. ASEAN has taken initial steps in this direction with the organization of the ASEAN Regional Forum. In the 1998 Presidential Summit of the Americas in Chile, the leaders agreed to "promote regional dialogue on building confidence and security with a view to revitalizing and strengthening the institutions of the Inter-American System, taking into account the new political, economic, social and strategic-military factors in the Hemisphere and its sub-regions".⁸

In the current strategic lull enjoyed by the US, these regional security initiatives should be encouraged in an effort to define a New World security order. National Defense University summarizes the strategic lull in its annual strategic assessment in 1998 as follows:

The United States now enjoys a secure and promising position in the world, because of its economic, technological, and military strengths. The other most successful nations are its closest friends; its few enemies are comparatively weak, isolated, and swimming against the current of the information age.⁹

⁸ John A. Cope, "Hemispheric Security Relations Remodeling the US Framework for the Americas," *Strategic Forum*, Number 147, Sept. 1998, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, pp. 1-2.

⁹ Hans Binnendijk, David C. Gompert and James L. Zackrisson, ed., *1998 Strategic Assessment: Engaging Power for Peace* (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1998), p. xiii

In terms of economic, technological and military power, the US currently enjoys unparalleled advantage. The US economy accounts for a fifth of global output. It leads or is at parity with world leaders in a majority of important technologies and it continues to account for nearly half of the world's expenditure on research and development. The US defense budget is five times more than any other nation. The most significant potential peer competitors including Russia and China all have fewer advantages and more problems. According to the Director of Defense Intelligence Agency, there will be no peer competitor to the US for the next two decades.¹⁰ Moreover, Western ideology of liberal democracy has become dominant at the current "end of history".¹¹ The global appeal of American ideas, institutions, leadership and culture is unrivaled. This strategic lull provides the US with a window of opportunity to redefine the security relationship from a realist paradigm into an idealist paradigm.

This redefinition would require a paradigm shift on the part of the US as well as the rest of the world. Ever since the Treaty of Westphalia, security has been dominated by a power structure defined from the realist perspective of balancing one power against another. This mindset has been challenged since the collapse of the Soviet Union and has led to a single practical demonstration during the Persian Gulf conflict where the world came together to restore the regional security threatened by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. However, the realist mindset is still prevalent among many policy makers. This has led several scholars to argue that Washington has long sought to "smother" the ambitions of other great powers and to integrate these powers into the US-led security system and global economy.¹² The heart of such a smothering strategy has been to prevent the rise

¹⁰ LTG Patrick M. Hughes, "Global Threats and Challenges: The Decades Ahead," Defense Intelligence Agency Publication, March 1999, p. 4.

¹¹ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," *The National Interest* (Summer 1989), p. 4.

¹² Benjamin Schwarz, "Why America thinks it has to run the World," *Atlantic Monthly* (June 1996) pp. 92-102, and Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).

of any political and military competitor. Under the current National Security Strategy of Engagement, the rationale is less compelling. Yet the objective of discouraging other powers from aspiring to play more active political and military roles was most candidly expressed after the Cold War in a preliminary draft of the Pentagon's planning guidance document that was leaked to the press in 1992.

Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is the dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power.¹³

Furthermore, the rest of the world has come to rely on the security blanket provided by the US to ease the burden of ensuring regional peace and stability. In many regions, US benign presence is still considered an essential balance of power against potential mid-size regional powers. While many regional organizations have made great strides in multilateral economic co-operation, they have only taken tentative and small steps towards multilateral security. ASEAN is a good example. Despite its inception in 1967, it has only started to discuss security issues under the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. Even then, progress has been slow and is still in the initial phases of discussing confidence-building measures. After such a long history, realist thinking is almost hardwired into the minds of policy makers.

Hence the key conceptual problem to the formulation of a regional collective security arrangement would be to get states to transcend the realist mindset. The realist mindset that advocates the absoluteness and divisibility of security is the fundamental hurdle that must be crossed. Given this, transition to a new security arrangement can only be implemented with a mental re-programming. The best way to do this is through a graduated and calculated

¹³ "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan. Prevent the Emergence of a New Rival," *New York Times*, March 8, 1992, p A14

approach. First, it can start with an ARF-type organization where the emphasis is on dialogue and confidence building among like-minded members. Through such dialogue and confidence building measures, a better understanding and agreement on common values and interests can eventually be achieved. It can then graduate to a security regime where states agree to uphold common norms of behavior. Finally there must be the forging of a collective security regime based on the precept of "one-for-all and all-for-one". Ultimately regional collective security organizations will work only if the objective and subjective conditions are favorable. A graduated and calculated approach to re-conditioning security mindsets will bring about these conditions. This may take a long time for such re-conditioning to occur, as it would require generations to adopt the collective security mindset.

However, the length of time needed should not deter the effort to put such regional collective security regimes in place as these have certain advantages that are appropriate to the prevention and resolution of future conflicts. Geographic proximity usually leads to greater common interests among states within a regional security grouping. It generates greater self-interest in each of the members in regional security and stability. It encourages better adherence to the common norms and standards of state behavior in a group, thereby preventing the occurrence of a conflict in the first place. Geographic proximity also facilitates early warning and preventive action, ensuring that timely action can be taken to prevent the escalation of any potential conflict. The existing infrastructure and mechanism for collective security would provide a ready vehicle for the implementation of an early warning and preventive action plan.

In the event of a conflict, states within a group with common and shared interests would be more amenable to seek peaceful resolution of conflicts and disagreements for the fear of escalation into a regional issue. Regional groups would usually be better suited to formulating local solutions to the problem. There

would also be a better in-depth knowledge and understanding of the local cultural issues, resulting in suitably tailored solutions which would address the source of the conflict better. There would also be a greater sense of ownership in the implementation of any plan of action, thereby ensuring greater commitment in terms of time and resources.

Furthermore, by acting as a first line of active defense against local conflicts, regional collective security groups perform a kind of triage on potential problems that could have international implications and may require international resources. As courts of first instance, they can provide legitimacy for subsequent enforcement action by multilateral coalitions. In cases where greater international resources are required, such groups could provide the potential center of gravity for galvanizing international support for multilateral intervention.

While regional collective security regimes have certain benefits, there are problems that would need to be addressed before those benefits could be enjoyed. Some of these have been alluded to in the foregoing discussion on the difficulties of changing mindsets about concepts of security and geo-strategic advantages of *Pax America*. The adoption of regional collective security concepts would require regional states to invest resources in the bureaucracies for the proper functioning of these regional security organizations. However, they could build on the current bureaucracies of the successful economic co-operative organizations. Currently, only NATO has the infrastructure and bureaucracy to effectively handle the decision and policy processes required for military intervention.¹⁴ Although it is relatively easier to get consensus in a smaller and more homogenous regional group than in the United Nations, considerable effort would still have to be invested in the control and decision mechanism to ensure

¹⁴ The current military intervention of NATO in Kosovo falls outside the ambit of a regional collective security arrangement. It is an outside of area operation by a military alliance. An example of collective action would be the efforts to maintain the peace between two member countries like Turkey and Greece.

timely decisions and building consensus for a particular action. NATO's action in Kosovo shows how difficult it is to get and maintain consensus among the 19 members. In the military arena, resources would have to be invested in common equipment, training and doctrine. Integrated command and control structures would have to be installed to undertake combined field operations. Combined exercises and training would have to be conducted to prepare different forces to operate together. There would also have to be a common set of doctrine to handle combined intervention operations.

There are also concerns about the ability of regional security organizations to exercise impartiality. In addition to past and existing conflicts of interest among members, most regional organizations have experienced difficulty in reconciling the diverse interests of members in decision-making and in coordinating field operations. Members tend to be concerned about the temptation of larger local powers to use regional organizations as cover for unilateral interventions. For instance, the Organization of African Unity has had to deal with ambitions of Nkrumah of Ghana, in the past, and Nigerian attempts to use its geographic size and oil riches to dominate the decision-making process in the present. In the longer run, the successful domination by a regional power may lead to the rise of a regional hegemon and a potential peer competitor, a prospect not looked upon favorably by a US comfortably ensconced in a *Pax America*. However, it must be realized that such a position may not be preserved in the long term anyway. While it is preferable, from the US perspective, to thwart the rise of a regional hegemon, it may not be possible to avoid it completely. Because of the expense, and domestic politics and concerns, a more sustainable strategy is to take steps to ensure that the dominant regional power is friendly and not hostile to US interests in the event that a regional hegemon cannot be avoided.

In the near term, several initiatives could be explored to bolster the capability of regional collective organizations to conduct multinational military

intervention operations. There has to be persistent efforts by the political leadership of interested nations to engage regional organizations in discussing possibilities for reducing the level of violence and conflict in their regions. These discussions should encourage such organizations to include collective security in their charter, which could include the use of multinational forces. Regional organizations that have the responsibility for collective security should develop appropriate political-military interfaces and infrastructure to manage multinational military operations. The principle of civilian control must dominate to prevent the rise of a multinational military dictatorship and to guard against the misuse of such multinational forces. NATO's North Atlantic Council can serve as a useful model.

While highly developed capabilities may not^{be} required in the initial stages, some modest steps can be taken to enhance capacities for the use of multinational forces in a short time without substantial increases in expenditures. The formation of a skeleton military headquarters and staff would be a modest step to improve the capacity of these regional organizations to respond if the organizations decide to employ military forces. In some regions, regional military training centers could be established where facilities have become available as a consequence of the downsizing of national military forces or for any other reasons. For an example, the Organization of American States could use the excess military facilities in Panama.

Specifically in the military arena, there should be concentrated efforts in the areas of command and control, intelligence and logistics. A unified command and control system among the multinational forces is essential to provide the vital link between the leadership and the troops. It should encompass the analysis, planning, decision-making and communications to direct multinational military operations. In multinational operations, provisions must also be made for intelligence support from several national sources. Military planners and

commanders need to understand the political and economic context of the conflict as well as the tactical situation. Nevertheless, intelligence support has been a major weakness of most multinational operations. This stems mainly from the reluctance to share intelligence because of the fear of compromising intelligence sources and methods. Finally, military operations cannot be conducted without a range of logistical support that includes airlift, sealift, and service support troops. Providing logistical support for multinational forces can be difficult because of national differences in equipment and procedures. Detailed information about local infrastructure, including water, power, and fuel supplies and transportation systems, ports, and airfields, along with health and other conditions that may affect military operations, must be included in operational planning. Assistance would have to be provided to these multinational forces to meet the challenging and difficult task of establishing unified command and control, intelligence support and logistics.

In the longer term with proper commitment and nurture, regional collective security organizations have the potential to share with the US some of the burden of maintaining regional security. This potential should be tapped in a more sustainable strategy of creating multiple centers of powers responsible for collective security and stability in particular regions. The US is in a unique position to lead the change to this new regime of collective security. The US can be said to have reached a point where its position in the security realm is similar to its position in the economic realm after World War II. Just as it laid the foundation of the global economic system with initiatives like the Bretton Woods Conference and the Marshall Plan, it should undertake initiatives in the security realm to lay the foundation for a collective security regime to deal with the security trends of the future.

The international system abhors unipolarity and global hegemonic pretensions, even by a great power that regards its hegemony as benign and

universally beneficial. Samuel Huntington characterized the current global power structure as "uni-multipolar"¹⁵ with one superpower and several major powers. In such a structure, there is an increasing tension between the US and the major regional powers. In the eyes of many countries, the US is seen as a "rouge superpower".¹⁶ The more the US proclaims itself as the sole remaining superpower, the greater the incentive for the other powers to seek opportunities to puncture that status. Rather than wait for that status to be punctured, the US should be proactive and capitalize on this window of opportunity to define a situation to preserve its vital interests by defining a sustainable security arrangement. The current strategic situation after the Cold War provides a transitional opportunity to re-define the world's conception of security. The US should make use of this opportunity to initiate the evolution of a more liberal concept of Westphalian statehood and the realist concept of balance of power into an idealist model based on common interests and shared responsibility.

¹⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1999, p. 37

¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 42

Annex: Existing Regional Organizations

Africa

- The Organization of African Unity (OAU)
- Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
- Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
- Southern African Development community (SADC)

Americas

- The Organization of American States (OAS)
- Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
- Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS)
- The Southern Cone (MERCOSUR)

Asia

- Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
- ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
- Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA)
- South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
- Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
- Partnership for Peace (PFP)

Europe and North Atlantic

- European Union (EU)
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
- North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)
- Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
- Western European Union (WEU)
- Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
- Partnership for Peace (PFP)

Middle East

- Arab League (AL)
- Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)
- Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
- Arab Cooperation Council (ACC)
- Arab Maghreb Union – North Africa (UMA)